Security of ordinary digital signature schemes relies on a computational assumption. Fail-stop signature (FSS) schemes provide security for a signer against a forger with unlimited computational power by enabling the signer to provide a proof of forgery, if it occurs. Signing long messages using FSS requires a hash function with provable security which results in a slow signature generation process. In this paper, we propose a new construction for FSS schemes based on linear authentication codes which does not require a hash function and results in a much faster signing process at the cost of slower verification process, and longer secret key and signature. An important advantage of the scheme is that proof of forgery is the same as a traditional FSS and does not rely on the properties of the hash functions.
CITATION STYLE
Safavi-Naini, R., Susilo, W., & Wang, H. (2000). Fail-stop signature for long messages. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 1977, pp. 165–177). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44495-5_15
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