The Genesis of Action in Husserl’s Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins

Abstract

In the present article, I discuss Husserl’s analysis of the genesis of action in the Husserliana edition Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. My aim is to clarify how a “voluntary action” has its genetic phenomenological origin in a “non-voluntary doing”, and, in turn, clarify how this latter activity has its genetic phenomenological origin in a passive “tendency” of the will. In order to achieve this aim, I first present the characterization of voluntary action as a “volitional process”. Then, I delimit the full scope of voluntary actions by analysing Husserl’s descriptions of the different degrees of “voluntariness”. After that, I explicate how voluntary actions phenomenologically originate from non-voluntary doings by examining the “consciousness of the I can”. Finally, I disclose the genetic phenomenological origin of non-voluntary doings by addressing the experience of tendency in the sphere of “passivity of the will”.