A Human Capital Perspective On Criminal Careers

Abstract

he existing economics literature has traditionally viewed crime as a choice-making process, where the potential criminal chooses among alternatives based upon the costs and benefits of each. Models by Becker, Rogers, Tullock, and Hellman, have generally portrayed the criminal choice equation as static and not allowed for the dynamic changes that may occur to the criminals aptitude, and income over long time horizons. This paper develops a dynamic choice model of criminal behavior over a criminal career including the acquisition process for both legal and criminal human capital. Psychic and monetary benefit and cost factors are discussed as well as the standard arguments concerning the probabilities of apprehension and convention. The model suggests that to alter the criminals choice pattern and, therefore, his education toward legal income-producing activities, the first instance of incarceration is the most crucial and that t(1) A learning multiplier exists for the criminal in both legal and illegal learning. (2) Greater segregation of prison populations by ordinal magnitude of offence could better separate criminal students from criminal mentors and further reduce criminal education. (3) Higher order legal skills training in the penal system may shift the education decision to legal educational pursuits. (4) Redefining the legal and constitutional rights afforded felons could increase the probability of repeat apprehension and reduce the incentive to repeat offenses.