Multi-Lateral Participants Decision-Making: A Distribution System Planning Approach with Incomplete Information Game

Abstract

Competition on distributed generation (DG) investments among multiple stakeholders in a distribution system results in incompleteness of market information, in which each stakeholder does not have full knowledge on investment and operation decisions of other participants. It leads to an incomplete information game among multiple stakeholders. This paper discusses a multi-lateral incomplete information game based approach to study distribution system planning while considering both supply and demand sides competitions. Profit models of three types of stakeholders, including DG investors (i.e., DG units are investor-owned), electricity consumers, and the distribution company, are constructed. The interaction among the stakeholders and their gaming behavior are further studied under the context of multi-lateral incomplete information. Bayesian Nash equilibrium form of the multi-lateral incomplete information game is obtained via Harsanyi transformation. An improved co-evolutionary algorithm is adopted to find the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Simulation results on a modified IEEE 33-bus test system show that, compared with the complete information game method, the proposed approach presents higher expected profits and more accurate planning schemes. Indeed, the proposed approach reflects the realistic planning process of distribution systems under a deregulated competitive environment, and it ensures fairness of competition among self-interested independent stakeholders while guaranteeing their individual performance.