This essay defines the ontology of mental illness or mental disorder in non-biomedical terms, as consisting of problematic propositional mental content rather than organic brain malfunction. This allows for a causal theory of mental disorder to be located within the parameters of existential difficulties rather than biological pathology, and contradicts the argument in defence of the necessity of psychotropic medications for the alleviation of mental distress. This in turn supports the argument that mental disorders can be treated, if not cured, by means of philosophy. Resumen. Este ensayo define la ontología de la enfermedad o desorden mental en términos no biomédicos, la cual se funda en contenidos proposicionales mentales antes que en una disfunción orgánica del cerebro. Esto permite localizar a la teoría causalística del desorden mental dentro de parámetros de dificultades existenciales antes que dentro de los de la patología biológica y contradice el argumento que defiende la necesidad de los psicofármacos para el alivio de la tensión mental. Esto apoya el argumento de que los desórdenes mentales pueden ser tratados, si bien no curados, a través de la filosofía. Palabras clave. Filosofía Aplicada, enfermedad mental, biomédico, psicofármacos. Twenty-eight year old Byron told me he was presently on medication for depression. A psychiatric assessment had indicated that he had bipolar disorder or manic depressive illness. He said he was suffering from anxiety, a lack of self confidence, and extreme shyness, especially around 'girls.' He told me he was an only child, and still living at home with his elderly parents, and that he was a virgin until about a year ago when he paid to have sex with a prostitute. He explained that he had 'obsessed' about four different girls in his teen years whom he had only watched from afar but never asked out, and that in his early twenties he had asked a number of other girls out but he had not shown up for any of the dates they had agreed to. He apologized for his various nervous ticks, many of which often looked like sexually aggressive gestures. He wondered if a philosopher might be more helpful to him than the psychiatrists and psychotherapists he had visited in the past. Their main treatment approach HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 1, pp. 13-41
CITATION STYLE
B. Raabe, P. (2010). ‘MENTAL ILLNESS’: ONTOLOGY, ETIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY AS ‘CURE.’ Haser, (1), 13–41. https://doi.org/10.12795/haser/2010.i1.01
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