Abstract
We propose a new cryptographically protected multi-round auction mechanism for online auctions. This auction mechanism is designed to provide (in this order) security, cognitive convenience, and round-effectiveness. One can vary internal parameters of the mechanism to trade off bid privacy and cognitive costs, or cognitive costs and the number of rounds. We are aware of no previous work that interleaves cryptography explicitly with the mechanism design. Keywords: auctions, cognitive costs, cryptography, mechanism design, privacy © IFCA/Springer-Verlag 2004.
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CITATION STYLE
Elkind, E., & Lipmaa, H. (2004). Interleaving cryptography and mechanism design the case of online auctions. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 3110, 117–131. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27809-2_16
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