The Legal Personhood of Artificial Intelligences

  • Kurki V
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Abstract

The chapter scrutinizes the legal personhood of artificial intelligences (AIs). It starts by distinguishing three relevant contexts. Most discussions of AI legal personhood focus either on the moral value of AIs (ultimate-value context); on whether AIs could or should be held responsible (responsibility context); or on whether they could acquire a more independent role in commercial transactions (commercial context). The chapter argues that so-called strong AIs—capable of performing similar tasks as human beings—can indeed function as legal persons regardless of whether such AIs are worthy of moral consideration. If an AI can function as a legal person, it can be granted legal personhood on somewhat similar grounds as a human collectivity. The majority of the chapter is focused on the role of AIs in commercial contexts, and new theoretical tools are proposed that would help distinguish different commercial AI legal personhood arrangements.

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Kurki, V. A. J. (2019). The Legal Personhood of Artificial Intelligences. In A Theory of Legal Personhood (pp. 175–190). Oxford University PressOxford. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198844037.003.0007

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