Information asymmetry and vertical collective action dilemma: The case of targeted poverty alleviation in China

Abstract

Information asymmetry is prevalent in the vertical bureaucratic structures of unitary systems. Drawing upon the institutional collective action (ICA) framework and the literature on information politics, this paper investigates the formation of the vertical ICA dilemma and the motivations underlying the collaborative mechanisms to address information asymmetry within the hierarchical bureaucratic structures of the Chinese government. Taking the Targeted Poverty Alleviation campaign as a case, we find a mixture of collective solutions, including informal networks, intergovernmental contracts, delegation, and imposed authority, as alternatives to alleviate the information asymmetry between vertical governments. Our case studies contribute to the literature on central–local relations, information politics, and the development of the vertical ICA framework, which notably incorporates the extent of lower level government autonomy into the determinants of integration mechanisms. In the conclusion, we connect this research to the broader ICA research agenda and studies of the cross-level policy process, with implications for multi-level governance in unitary systems like China.