Reducing the entropy of the mask is a technique which has been proposed to mitigate the high performance overhead of masked software implementations of symmetric block ciphers. Rotating S-box Masking (RSM) is an example of such schemes applied to AES with the purpose of maintaining the security at least against univariate first-order side-channel attacks. This article examines the vulnerability of a realization of such technique using the side-channel measurements publicly available through DPA contest V4. Our analyses which focus on exploiting the first-order leakage of the implementation discover a couple of potential attacks which can recover the secret key. Indeed the leakage we exploit is due to a design mistake as well as the characteristics of the implementation platform, none of which has been considered during the design of the countermeasure (implemented in naive C code). © 2014 Springer International Publishing.
CITATION STYLE
Moradi, A., Guilley, S., & Heuser, A. (2014). Detecting hidden leakages. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 8479 LNCS, pp. 324–342). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07536-5_20
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.