Fringe consciousness: A useful framework for clarifying the nature of experience-based metacognitive feelings

Abstract

This chapter discusses how inconsistencies in Koriat's treatment of experience-based metacognitive feelings can be resolved by the integration of ideas and methods from research on fringe consciousness. Experience-based metacognitive feelings are claimed to reflect properties of ongoing cognitive activity, in contrast to information-based metacognitive judgements which are claimed to reflect the content of one's knowledge. However the empirical examples taken to support the lack of influence of knowledge content are problematic. It is also unclear what the criterion is for defining retrieved knowledge as implicit or explicit. We suggest that theoretical assumptions and empirical examples from research on the overlapping concept of fringe consciousness can help resolve such inconsistencies. The fringe consciousness framework states that metacognitive feelings can be shaped by implicit knowledge content and provides examples of how the implicitness of such knowledge can be measured. We point to some theoretical and empirical implications of a closer integration between these two frameworks. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.