Distress in European Banks: An Analysis Basedon a New Dataset

Abstract

Using a unique data set on bank distress, this paper provides novel empirical evidence on the determinants of bank soundness in the European Union (EU) as a whole. The estimation results are consistent with the hypothesis that bank risks have converged across EU members, providing empirical support for introduction of a more centralized system of financial regulation in the EU. We show that asset quality and earning profile of banks are important determinants of bank distress next to leverage, suggesting that these should be central in EU-wide financial regulation and supervision. We find that market discipline, both by depositors and by stock market participants, plays a role in the EU, supporting the notion that transparency and dissemination of financial information would contribute to the financial soundness of banks. Our data also point to the presence of contagion effects, relatively higher fragility of concentrated banking sectors, and hazards associated with high ratios of wholesale funding.