We argue that threshold trust is not an option in most of the real-life electronic auctions. We then propose two new cryptographic Vickrey auction schemes that involve, apart from the bidders and the seller S, an auction authority A so that unless S and A collude the outcome of auctions will be correct, and moreover, S will not get any information about the bids, while A will learn bid statistics. Further extensions make it possible to decrease damage that colluding S and A can do, and to construct (m + l)st price auction schemes. The communication complexity between the S and A in medium-size auctions is at least one order of magnitude less than in the Naor-Pinkas-Sumner scheme.
CITATION STYLE
Lipmaa, H., Asokan, N., & Niemi, V. (2003). Secure vickrey auctions without threshold trust. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 2357, pp. 87–101). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36504-4_7
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