Aristotelian ethical virtue: Naturalism without measure

Abstract

There are significant, plausibly naturalistic elements of Aristotle’s ethical philosophy, and their plausibility does not depend on acceptance of Aristotle’s overall teleological metaphysics. Moreover, they involve conceptions of practical rationality and virtue that are explanatorily and ethically illuminating. Though Aristotle’s view is not amenable to assimilation into psychological and social sciences comprising quantitatively precise law-like generalizations, it is appropriate to regard it as naturalistic. This is because of the way in which a human being’s constitutive capacities, conditions of life, and experiences (including the development and exercise of rationality) jointly form an individual’s specific realized second nature. Virtue cannot be acquired or exercised independent of a thickly empirical context of perception, feeling, desire, and decision, but the presence and exercise of virtue cannot be measured in quantitative terms alone. Nor can the relevant features of a person be properly interpreted apart from distinctively ethical practical wisdom.