The Mafia fraud consists in an adversary transparently relaying the physical layer signal during an authentication process between a verifier and a remote legitimate prover. This attack is a major concern for certain RFID systems, especially for payment related applications. Previously proposed protocols that thwart the Mafia fraud treat relaying and non-relaying types of attacks equally: whether or not signal relaying is performed, the same probability of false-acceptance is achieved. Naturally, one would expect that non-relay type of attacks achieve a lower probability of false-acceptance. We propose a low complexity authentication protocol that achieves a probability of false-acceptance essentially equal to the best possible false-acceptance probability in the presence of Mafia frauds. This performance is achieved without degrading the performance of the protocol in the non-relay setting. As an additional feature, the verifier can make a rational decision to accept or to reject a proof of identity even if the protocol gets unexpectedly interrupted. © 2009 Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
CITATION STYLE
Avoine, G., & Tchamkerten, A. (2009). An efficient distance bounding rfid authentication protocol: Balancing false-acceptance rate and memory requirement. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 5735 LNCS, pp. 250–261). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04474-8_21
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.