Reducing the number of bits in the BTB to attack the branch predictor hot-spot

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Abstract

Current superscalar processors access the BTB early to anticipate the branch/jump target address. This access is frequent and aggressively performed since the BTB is accessed every cycle for all instructions in the ICache line being fetched. This fact increases the power density, which could create hot spots, thus increasing packaging and cooling costs. Power consumption in the BTB comes mostly from its two main fields: the tag and the target address fields. Reducing the length of either of these fields reduces power consumption, silicon area and access time. This paper analyzes at what extent tag and target address lengths could be reduced to benefit both dynamic and static power consumption, silicon area, and access time, while sustaining performance. Experimental results show that the tag length and the target address could be reduced by about a half and one byte, respectively with no performance losses. BTB peak power savings can reach about 35% when both reductions are combined together, thus effectively attacking the hot-spot. © 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

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APA

Tomás, N., Sahuquillo, J., Petit, S., & López, P. (2008). Reducing the number of bits in the BTB to attack the branch predictor hot-spot. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 5168 LNCS, pp. 317–326). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85451-7_35

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