Cryptographic algorithms implemented in embedded devices must withstand Side Channel Attacks such as the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). A common method of protecting symmetric cryptographic implementations against DPA is to use masking techniques. However, clever masking of non-linear parts such as S-Boxes is difficult and has been the flaw of many countermeasures. In this article, we take advantage of some remarkable properties of the Fourier Transform to propose a new method to thwart DPA on the implementation of every S-Box. After introducing criteria so that an implementation is qualified as DPA-resistant, we prove the security of our scheme. Finally, we apply the method to FOX and AES S-Boxes and we show in the latter case that the resulting implementation is one of the most efficient. © International Association for Cryptologic Research 2006.
CITATION STYLE
Prouff, E., Giraud, C., & Aumônier, S. (2006). Provably secure S-Box implementation based on Fourier transform. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4249 LNCS, pp. 216–230). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/11894063_17
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