David Lewis developed one of the most prominent versions of epistemic contextualism (EC) in Elusive Knowledge [2], which is also known as a version of relevant alternatives theory (RAT). In this work, I propose a simple formalization of Lewis account, which results in our basic Lewisian epistemic logic (LEL). Trivial as it may seem, my formalization focuses directly on Lewis's theory, and thus provides a firm basis to discuss his theses on anti-skepticism, infallible knowledge, rules of relevance, and especially "knowledge without belief". Moreover, my formalization not only avoids problems of two former existed formalizations [1],[3], but also partly answers Holliday's question how a relevant alternatives theorist should handle higher-order knowledge [1]. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.
CITATION STYLE
Xu, Z. (2011). Capturing Lewis’s “elusive knowledge.” In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 6953 LNAI, pp. 400–401). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24130-7_37
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