Abstract
We propose a technique for verifying high-level security properties of cryptographic protocol implementations based on stepwise refinement. Our refinement strategy supports reasoning about abstract protocol descriptions in the symbolic model of cryptography and gradually concretizing them towards executable code. We have implemented the technique within a general-purpose program verifier VCC and applied it to an extract from a draft reference implementation of Trusted Platform Module, written in C. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Polikarpova, N., & Moskal, M. (2012). Verifying implementations of security protocols by refinement. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 7152 LNCS, pp. 50–65). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27705-4_5
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