Authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange allows two principals communicating over a public network, and each holding public/ private keys, to agree on a shared secret value. In this paper we study the natural extension of this cryptographic problem to a group of principals. We begin from existing formal security models and refine them to incorporate major missing details (e.g., strong-corruption and concurrent sessions). Within this model we define the execution of a protocol for authenticated dynamic group Diffie-Hellman and show that it is provably secure under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our security result holds in the standard model and thus provides better security guarantees than previously published results in the random oracle model.
CITATION STYLE
Bresson, E., Chevassut, O., & Pointcheval, D. (2002). Dynamic group diffie-hellman key exchange under standard assumptions. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 2332, pp. 321–336). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46035-7_21
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