Evolutionary game analysis of recycling management of waste power batteries of new energy vehicles

Abstract

Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a game model between the government and power battery manufacturers with the aim of promoting the innovation of recycling technology to achieve sustainable development of energy and environment. The effects of penalties and subsidies on the behavior of power battery manufacturers in adopting green innovation technology strategies under unilateral and bilateral government policies are compared. Numerical simulations are used to verify the validity of the model and conclude that: penalties and subsidies can change the final choice of power battery manufacturers only when a certain threshold is exceeded; penalties can make power battery manufacturers adopt green innovation technology strategies more steadily than subsidies at an earlier stage when the green innovation technology surplus is negative; the number of recycling and the degree of technological innovation are also important factors affecting the evolutionary process of power battery manufacturers. Meanwhile, the above conclusions can provide some suggestions for the government to effectively manage the recycling of waste power batteries.