Power Relations in Malawi’s Social Cash Transfer Programme: The Flip Side of Domination

Abstract

The Sustainable Development Goals call for nationally appropriate social protection systems. However, development partners and governments might disagree over what is appropriate, who to protect, how to do this, and who should pay for it. This paper explores how power relations between national and international stakeholders shaped Malawi’s Social Cash Transfer Programme (SCTP) by tracing its design and implementation. It draws on novel empirical data from 47 in-depth interviews with key stakeholders. Data are analysed drawing on literature around power relations, political settlements, and decision making. It finds that development partners’ power to shape the SCTP generates resistance among Malawian politicians and enables them to pursue its own priorities. The paper shows how power relations work in practice and argues that power relations are complex, entangled, and that decisions which appear rational can result in outcomes that are detrimental to developing nationally owned, sustainable, social protection systems.