The security of key agreement protocols has traditionally been notoriously hard to establish. In this paper we present a modular approach to the construction of proofs of security for a large class of key agreement protocols. By following a modular approach to proof construction, we hope to enable simpler and less error-prone analysis and proof generation for such key agreement protocols. The technique is compatible with Bellare-Rogaway style models as well as the more recent models of Bellare et al. and Canetti and Krawczyk. In particular, we show how the use of a decisional oracle can aid the construction of proofs of security for this class of protocols and how the security of these protocols commonly reduces to some form of Gap assumption. © International Association for Cryptologic Research 2005.
CITATION STYLE
Kudla, C., & Paterson, K. G. (2005). Modular security proofs for key agreement protocols. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 3788 LNCS, pp. 549–565). https://doi.org/10.1007/11593447_30
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