Cognitive Flexibility and Epistemic Validation in Learning from Multiple Texts

Abstract

Advanced learning in ill-structured domains is frequently based on multiple documents that contain conflicting information and opposing perspectives on the same or related issues (such as multiple texts belonging to a scientific controversy). In such cases, cognitive flexibility can be defined as the ability to develop a justified point of view by adopting some arguments and rejecting others on rational grounds. I suggest that learners can achieve this goal only if they actively and strategically validate incoming text information against previously acquired knowledge and beliefs (epistemic validation, statement 1). Up to now, the cognitive processes underlying epistemic validation have not been addressed by the major theories in the fields of text comprehension and learning from text. I introduce a simple process model according to which epistemic validation rests on two types of cognitive processes, (automatic) epistemic monitoring and (strategic) epistemic elaboration (statement 2). Epistemic monitoring means that learners regularly and efficiently monitor incoming text information for internal consistency and plausibility. In many cases, learners tend to refute new information that conflicts with their prior knowledge or information acquired earlier. Alternatively, learners motivated and able to do so may engage in an effortful and strategic epistemic elaboration of arguments that are initially evaluated as implausible. Finally, I propose that learners’ epistemological beliefs serve as declarative metacognition that is crucial for engagement in epistemic elaboration. As such, epistemological beliefs determine whether learners achieve cognitive flexibility in learning with multiple texts (statement 3).