Abstract
Many studies in the context of traffic simulation investigate effects of new regulation strategies on travel times. However, in most cases it is assumed, that these regulations are followed by all actors. This work investigates the effects of non-compliance of simulated road user agents. In particular it is analyzed to what extent rule breaking agents have advantages on the cost of the remaining road users. For evaluation we take into account three different scenarios: Overtaking prohibition for trucks on motorways, bicycles pushing to the front at traffic lights and pedestrians crossing roads in aggressive manner. In all scenarios, the fraction of rule breaking agents is varied. Simulation results show that rule breaking does not always lead to disadvantages for the remaining road users. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.
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Dallmeyer, J., Lattner, A. D., & Timm, I. J. (2012). Selfish road users - Case studies on rule breaking agents for traffic simulation. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 7598 LNAI, pp. 83–95). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33690-4_9
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