The Thin Moral Concept of Evil

0Citations
Citations of this article
6Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.

Abstract

Evil-scepticism comes in two varieties: one variety is descriptive, where it is claimed that the concept of evil does not successfully denote anything in the world; the other variety is normative, where it is claimed that the concept of evil is not a helpful or useful concept to be employing in either our social or interpersonal lives. This paper argues that evil-scepticism can be responded to by understanding the concept of evil as a thin moral concept. Understood in this thin way, the descriptive challenge fades, because the concept of evil does not even purport to denote anything in the world (it is purely evaluative), and so does the normative argument, since the thinness of the concept means that, first, it is ineliminable anyway, and, second, its malleability allows for it to be used for progressive and constructive means.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Wilby, M. (2022). The Thin Moral Concept of Evil. Studies in the History of Philosophy, 13(3), 39–62. https://doi.org/10.12775/szhf.2022.015

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free