People’s explanatory preferences for scientific phenomena

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Abstract

Previous work has found that people are drawn to explanations of psychological phenomena when these explanations contain neuroscience information, even when that information is irrelevant. This preference may be due to a general preference for reductive explanations; however, prior work has not investigated whether people indeed prefer such explanations or whether this preference varies by scientific discipline. The current study asked 82 participants to choose which methods would be most appropriate for investigating topics in six scientific fields. Participants generally preferred methods that either matched the field of investigation (e.g., biology for biology) or that came from the immediately more reductive field (e.g., chemistry for biology). Both of these patterns were especially evident for the pairing of psychology and neuroscience. Additionally, participants selected significantly more methods as being useful for explaining neuroscience phenomena. These results suggest that people’s sense of the relations among scientific fields are fairly well calibrated but display some general attraction to neuroscience.

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Weisberg, D. S., Hopkins, E. J., & Taylor, J. C. V. (2018). People’s explanatory preferences for scientific phenomena. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications, 3(1). https://doi.org/10.1186/s41235-018-0135-2

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