Non-black-box techniques in cryptography

Abstract

In cryptography we typically prove the security of a scheme by reducing the task of breaking the scheme to some hard computational problem. This reduction usually done in a black-box fashion. By this we mean that there is an algorithm that can solve the hard problem given any black-box for breaking the scheme. This lecture concerns exceptions to this rule: that is, schemes that are proven secure using a non-black-box reduction, that actually uses the code of a scheme-breaking attacker to construct a problem-solving algorithm. It turns out that such reductions can be used to obtain schemes with better properties that were known before. In fact, in some cases these non-black-box reductions can be obtain goals that were proven to be impossible to achieve when restricting to black-box reductions. In particular, we will present constructions of zero-knowledge protocols that are proven secure under various compositions [1, 2, 3] We'll also discuss some of the limitations and open questions regarding non-black-box security proofs. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006.