Misplaced prudence: The role of restraint in the nuclear threat environment for North American strategic defense

Abstract

International relations theory provides analytic lenses for evaluating the dynamics of today’s dangerous and unstable nuclear threat environment. Both realist and constructivist theories recognize the importance of restraint in these environments. Realists focus on the security dilemma, understanding that the pursuit of security can mistakenly incite fears of aggression on the part of others. Constructivists focus on normative, rather than strategic, restraint. Psychological insights deepen concerns about the wisdom of bellicose policies, given the potential to create spirals of conflict based on emotional and vitriolic reactions and the possibilities of misinterpreting signals. When psychological dynamics are added, restraint becomes more imperative, even as it becomes more difficult to achieve. These insights undermine strategies based on apparent ‘prudence’, requiring practitioners to consider not just interpretations of signals from adversaries but also how their own signals may be misinterpreted. We evaluate the threat posed by Iran and North Korea to North American strategic defense. Restraint remains one of the most difficult decisions for policy makers, one for which practitioners are often heavily criticized, yet key for North American defense. By relying more heavily on the special interlacing institutions providing North American strategic defense—U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), bi-national North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC)—policymakers acquire more perspectives to help overcome misperception, reinforce reassurance, and better safeguard North America.