Password-based authenticated key exchange are protocols which are designed to be secure even when the secret key or password shared between two users is drawn from a small set of values. Due to the low entropy of passwords, such protocols are always subject to on-line guessing attacks. In these attacks, the adversary may succeed with non-negligible probability by guessing the password shared between two users during its on-line attempt to impersonate one of these users. The main goal of password-based authenticated key exchange protocols is to restrict the adversary to this case only. In this paper, we consider password-based authenticated key exchange in the three-party scenario, in which the users trying to establish a secret do not share a password between themselves but only with a trusted server. Towards our goal, we recall some of the existing security notions for password-based authen-ticated key exchange protocols and introduce new ones that are more suitable to the case of generic constructions. We then present a natural generic construction of a three-party protocol, based on any two-party authenticated key exchange protocol, and prove its security without making use of the Random Oracle model. To the best of our knowledge, the new protocol is the first provably-secure password-based protocol in the three-party setting. © International Association for Cryptologic Research 2005.
CITATION STYLE
Abdalla, M., Fouque, P. A., & Pointcheval, D. (2005). Password-based authenticated key exchange in the three-party setting. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 3386, pp. 65–84). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30580-4_6
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