Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO ’96

  • Koblitz N
  • International Association for Cryptologic Research. P
  • IEEE Computer Society. Technical Committee on Security and Privacy.
  • et al.
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Abstract

By carefully measuring the amount of time required to perform private key operations, attackers may be able to find fixed Diffie-Hellman exponents, factor RSA keys, and break other cryptosystems. Against a vulnerable system, the attack is computationally inexpensive and often requires only known ciphertext. Actual systems are potentially at risk, including cryptographic tokens, network-based cryptosystems, and other applications where attackers can make reasonably accurate timing measurements. Techniques for preventing the attack for RSA and Diffie-Hellman are presented. Some cryptosystems will need to be revised to protect against the attack, and new protocols and algorithms may need to incorporate measures to prevent timing attacks.

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CITATION STYLE

APA

Koblitz, N., International Association for Cryptologic Research., P., IEEE Computer Society. Technical Committee on Security and Privacy., & University of California, S. Barbara. C. S. Department. (1996). Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO ’96. Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology, 1109, 415. Retrieved from https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=706156 http://link.springer.com/10.1007/3-540-68697-5

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