The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences

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Abstract

We consider a core of a simple game with ordinal preferences on a set of alternative outcomes Ω. When a player's strict preference relation takes any logically possible form of acyclic binary relation on Ω, necessary conditions for a simple game to have a nonempty core are given. If Ω is a finite set, the conditions are also sufficient. Further some related results are obtained. © 1979 Physica-Verlag.

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APA

Nakamura, K. (1979). The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences. International Journal of Game Theory, 8(1), 55–61. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01763051

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