OMAC, TMAC and XCBC are CBC-type MAC schemes which are provably secure for arbitrary message length. In this paper, we present a more tight upper bound on Advmac for each scheme, where Advmac denotes the maximum success (forgery) probability of adversaries. Our bounds are expressed in terms of the total length of all queries of an adversary to the MAC generation oracle while the previous bounds are expressed in terms of the maximum length of each query. In particular, a significant improvement occurs if the lengths of queries are heavily unbalanced. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003.
CITATION STYLE
Iwata, T., & Kurosawa, K. (2003). Stronger security bounds for OMAC, TMAC, and XCBC. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 2904, 402–415. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24582-7_30
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