This chapter proposes a spatial model that combines both programmatic as well as clientelistic modes of vote-seeking. In the model political parties strategically choose: (1) their programmatic policy position, (2) the effort they devote to clientelism as opposed to the promotion of their programmatic position, and (3) the set of voters who are targeted to receive clientelistic benefits. I present a theorem which demonstrates that, in its most general form, a spatial model with clientelism yields either Downsian convergence without clientelist targeting, or an inifinite cycle. Put otherwise, in its most general form the model never yields a Nash Equilibrium with positive levels of clientelism. I relate this result to past research on instability in coalition formation processes, and then identify additional restrictions, regarding voter turnout and the set of voters which parties can target, which serve to generate Nash equilibria with positive clientelist effort.
CITATION STYLE
Kselman, D. (2013). A non-existence theorem for clientelism in spatial models. In Advances in Political Economy: Institutions, Modelling and Empirical Analysis (Vol. 9783642352393, pp. 181–201). Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35239-3_9
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