The current credit rationing heavily influences entrepreneurship and, more dramatically, the viability of innovation projects. In this context, mechanisms to screen successful projects are of paramount importance for both lenders and entrepreneurs. We present an experiment to test the collateral-interest mechanism of credit screening. Our results confirm that incentive-compatible pairs of collateral-interest rate can distinguish between projects of different success probability, even in moral hazard settings.
CITATION STYLE
Capra, C. M., Comeig, I., & Fernández-Blanco, M. O. (2014). Entrepreneurship and credit rationing: How to screen successful projects in this current crisis period. In Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Economic Crisis: Lessons for Research, Policy and Practice (pp. 139–147). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02384-7_15
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