Accountability of the ECB’s supervisory activities (SSM): Evolving and responsive

Abstract

This article develops a theory of accountability as a means of increasing regulatory effectiveness in complex policy environments and applies it to the supervisory powers that have been assigned to the European Central Bank through the Single Supervisory Mechanism. It finds that the use of the Single Supervisory Mechanism by the European Central Bank has been evolving. The Single Supervisory Mechanism / European Central Bank has expanded and improved the information it provides to other European Union institutions and the public, and has progressively elaborated the explanation of its decisions and regulatory instruments. These developments are welcome because they are indications of an accountable institution that seeks to demonstrate how its actions meet its obligations. However, there is still lack of a performance benchmark against which the actions of the Single Supervisory Mechanism /European Central Bank can be evaluated and of expert review of Single Supervisory Mechanism /European Central Bank decisions. In complex policy environments it is not possible for outsiders to assess the soundness of regulatory actions without access to confidential information. Therefore, this article proposes that the European Parliament establishes a policy or regulatory audit by external experts who can assess such information on a confidential basis.