Abstract
We introduce and analyze a side-channel attack on a straight-forward implementation of the RSA key generation step. The attack exploits power information that allows to determine the number of the trial divisions for each prime candidate. Practical experiments are conducted, and countermeasures are proposed. For realistic parameters the success probability of our attack is in the order of 10-15 %. © 2009 Springer.
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CITATION STYLE
Finke, T., Gebhardt, M., & Schindler, W. (2009). A new side-channel attack on RSA prime generation. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 5747 LNCS, pp. 141–155). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04138-9_11
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