Inferring

Abstract

Conceptual knowledge can be augmented in either of two ways: by forming new propositions out of nonpropositional material (e.g. percepts), or by inferring new propositions from a set of known ones. We do the former, for instance, when producing empirical data and proposing conjectures to explain them. And we infer when, for example, drawing conclusions from a set of premises and leaping to generalizations on the strength of particulars. Both processes are equally important in all fields of inquiry. However, the importance of inference is often underrated by those workers who, misled by empiricism, believe that all they have to do is collect solid facts and abstain from committing what they regard as the capital sin of the intellect, namely jumping to conclusions. But, of course, those who do not jump do not overcome any hurdles, and so do not participate in any original cognitive venture.