A Value-Critical Policy Analysis of Georgia’s Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard of Proof of Intellectual Disability

Abstract

The U.S. Supreme Court’s Atkins v. Virginia decision barred the execution of persons with intellectual disability, but provided minimal specification regarding adjudication. One exception to the lack of instruction was the recommendation that states generally conform to accepted clinical practice and norms, positioning professional associations to take an important role in this discourse. This study uses Chambers and Wedel’s value-critical method of analysis to examine the policy element, standard of proof of intellectual disability, within Georgia’s 1988 statute prohibiting the execution of persons with intellectual disability. Owing to the public outcry that followed Georgia’s controversial execution of Jerome Bowden, who evidenced significant impairments in intellectual and adaptive functioning, the 1988 statute was the first in the nation to bar such executions, and predated the Atkins decision by 14 years. However, due to a drafting error, Georgia was also the only state to invoke the highest standard of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt. When states use a standard of proof of intellectual disability that is higher than the lowest standard, a preponderance of the evidence, capital defendants with intellectual disability are at an increased risk for unlawful execution. We present findings and recommendations across the identified analytical contexts.