We consider a special case of weighted congestion games with player-specific latency functions where each player uses for each particular resource a fixed (non-decreasing) delay function together with a player-specific constant. For each particular resource, the resource-specific delay function and the playerspecific constant (for that resource) are composed by means of a group operation (such as addition or multiplication) into a player-specific latency function. We assume that the underlying group is a totally ordered abelian group. In this way, we obtain the class of weighted congestion games with player-specific constants; we observe that this class is contained in the new intuitive class of dominance weighted congestion games. We obtain the following results: Games on parallel links: Every unweighted congestion game has a generalized ordinal potential. There is a weighted congestion game with 3 players on 3 parallel links that does not have the Finite Best-Improvement Property. There is a particular best-improvement cycle for general weighted congestion games with player-specific latency functions and 3 players whose outlaw implies the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium. This cycle is indeed outlawed for dominance weighted congestion games with 3 players - and hence for weighted congestion games with player-specific constants and 3 players. Network congestion games: For unweighted symmetric network congestion games with player-specific additive constants, it is PLS-complete to find a pure Nash equilibrium. Arbitrary (non-network) congestion games: Every weighted congestion game with linear delay functions and player-specific additive constants has a weighted potential. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007.
CITATION STYLE
Mavronicolas, M., Milchtaich, I., Monien, B., & Tiemann, K. (2007). Congestion games with player-specific constants. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4708 LNCS, pp. 633–644). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74456-6_56
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