Knowledge and error have a quantitative dimension – we can know more and less, and we can be wrong to a greater or lesser extent. This fact underpins prominent approaches to epistemic normativity, which we can loosely call truth-consequentialist. These approaches face a significant challenge, however, stemming from the observation that some truths seem more epistemically valuable than others. In this paper I trace out this perspectivalist challenge, showing that although it arises from a mistaken picture of the quantitative dimension of knowledge and error, when we reconceive how that quantitative dimension should be understood we find the perspectivalist challenge has survived unscathed.
CITATION STYLE
Treanor, N. (2020). Perspectivalism About Knowledge and Error. In Synthese Library (Vol. 416, pp. 107–121). Springer Science and Business Media B.V. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27041-4_7
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