Euroscepticism and the Next Enlargements

Abstract

This chapter draws upon the findings of the previous chapters of this book. In Chapters 2 and 3 the analysis stressed increasing levels of Euroscepticism in the run-up to accession. Also, the comparative analysis highlighted the parallel electoral success of populist parties. Here, the chapter presents a theme that the in-depth examination of the Polish case brought to light: after the opening of the negotiation process and the long period of waiting, it is easier for populist parties to channel citizens’ dissatisfaction, particularly pointing to Euroscepticism, using it as external face of their empty ideological box – in their ‘chameleonic’ nature (Taggart, 2000). It is likely that favourable institutional settings, high volatility rates, and the new politics – absorbed by the CEE countries (Wisniowski, 2000) – together with a large agrarian sector (as in Poland and Romania) and the success or failure of the economic transition (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2001) can favour the emergence of the accession populism, that type of populism rising specifically on the verge of accession and using Euroscepticism as its external face.