Abstract
In this commentary on Rott's paper Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief into Knowledge, I discuss two problems of the stability theory of knowledge which are pointed out by Rott. I conclude that these problems offer no reason for rejecting the stability theory, but might be grounds for deviating from the standard AGM account of belief revision which Rott presupposes. © 2005 Springer.
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CITATION STYLE
APA
Mechtenberg, L. (2005). The stability theory of knowledge and belief revision: Comments on rott. In Contextualisms in Epistemology (pp. 353–365). Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3835-6_21
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