Intelligence in strategic games

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Abstract

If an agent, or a coalition of agents, has a strategy, knows that she has a strategy, and knows what the strategy is, then she has a know-how strategy. Several modal logics of coalition power for know-how strategies have been studied before. The contribution of the article is three-fold. First, it proposes a new class of know-how strategies that depend on the intelligence information about the opponents’ actions. Second, it shows that the coalition power modality for the proposed new class of strategies cannot be expressed through the standard know-how modality. Third, it gives a sound and complete logical system that describes the interplay between the coalition power modality with intelligence and the distributed knowledge modality in games with imperfect information.

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CITATION STYLE

APA

Naumov, P., & Yuan, Y. (2021). Intelligence in strategic games. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 71, 521–556. https://doi.org/10.1613/JAIR.1.12883

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