The financial structure of the derivatives insured by AIG with credit default swaps (CDS) was ultimately related to the systemic risk from the inability of the mortgagors to service their debts. AIG made several serious mistakes. First: The estimate of the drift of the capital gain, which drove the bubble, was based upon the unsustainable growth of the housing price index 2004-2006. A collapse would occur when the unsustainable capital gain declined below the interest rate. Second, risk was underestimated because AIG ignored the negative correlation between the capital gains and the liabilities/claims. The CDS claims grew when the value of the insured obligations declined. This set off collateral requirements, and the stability of AIG was undermined. The solution for the optimal insurance liabilities on the basis of SOC is derived. The SOC approach is a generalization of the contributions of the economics and actuarial literature. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the government bailout.
CITATION STYLE
Stein, J. L. (2012). AIG in the Crisis. In Stochastic Optimal Control and the U.S. Financial Debt Crisis (pp. 97–115). Springer US. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-3079-7_6
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.