End-to-end auditable voting systems are expected to guarantee very interesting, and often sophisticated security properties, including correctness, privacy, fairness, receipt-freeness, ... However, for many well-known protocols, these properties have never been analyzed in a systematic way. In this paper, we investigate the use of techniques from the simulation-based security tradition for the analysis of these protocols, through a case-study on the ThreeBallot protocol. Our analysis shows that the ThreeBallot protocol fails to emulate some natural voting functionality, reflecting the lack of election fairness guarantee from this protocol. Guided by the reasons that make our security proof fail, we propose a simple variant of the ThreeBallot protocol and show that this variant emulates our functionality. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007.
CITATION STYLE
De Marneffe, O., Pereira, O., & Quisquater, J. J. (2007). Simulation-based analysis of E2E voting systems. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4896 LNCS, pp. 137–149). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77493-8_12
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.