The changing political economy of pension fund accounting regulation: A comparative study of four Anglo-American countries

Abstract

This article examines the inter-relationships between changes in the political economy of pensions law and changes in pension accounting regulation in four Anglo-American countries. A four-fold property rights framework is developed that identifies the common inequities in the ownership of pension deficits and surpluses. Deficiencies are identified relating to various issues concerning the recognition, measurement and disclosure of pension fund surpluses or deficits. These aspects include inequality in pension provision, the capture of pension regulation through delegation to narrow professional bodies, the corporatisation of pension accounting language and discourse, and the general opaqueness and dimunition of public pension regulations. Until the 1970s, pensions were generally seen as being a paternalistic social security and pension funds were relatively unregulated. However, the social and economic consequences of ageing populations on the financing of public pensions has brought about a new emphasis on professionally developed accounting standards as a primary means of regulating the accountability of pension funds. © 2011 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.