Judge Bias in Labor Courts and Firm Performance

  • Cahuc P
  • Carcillo S
  • Patault B
  • et al.
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Abstract

This paper documents the existence of judge-specific differences on granting compensation for wrongful dismissal and shows that their consequences are different for small low-performing firms than for other firms. Pro-worker judge bias reduces job creation for all firms, increases the destruction of permanent jobs in small and low-performing firms but reduces it in large high-performing firms. Pro-worker bias reduces employment and survival for small and low-performing firms but has no significant effects on these outcomes for the other firms. The probability that permanent incumbent workers keep their job in firms judged by a pro-worker judge increases in large and high-performing firms, while it decreases in small, poorly performing firms.

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APA

Cahuc, P., Carcillo, S., Patault, B., & Moreau, F. (2023). Judge Bias in Labor Courts and Firm Performance. Journal of the European Economic Association. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad046

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