Paradox, paraconsistency and logical revision

Abstract

This chapter suggests that the approach suggested to this point provides a novel approach to understanding logical paradoxes. In particular, I argue that what is typically thought to be captured by paraconsistency and paracompleteness is best understood as a form of epistemological instability that can be dealt with in the context of the dialogical dynamics of reasoning. This is used to motivate an approach called paracoherence, which can deal with strengthened versions of paradox, and is compatible with a bivalent approach to local truth and falsity. This will be clarified by first considering logic and paradox in relation to standard arguments regarding logical revision. Arguments for and against logical revisionism share assumptions regarding logical rules that have been argued against in previous chapters. As such, I suggest that the interactive approach provides not a revision of logic, but an attempt to rethink logic from the ground up.