Cyber deterrence theory and practise

Abstract

This chapter evaluates the feasibility of cyber deterrence strategies. In the past few years, cyberspace has been the centre of attention for military policymakers, with states racing to assert their dominance and superiority. As with the advent of aerial warfare and air power in the first half of the twentieth century, the cyber domain has seen a rapid influx of technology. This praxis has outpaced theoretical formulation and conceptual development, with the result being that old strategies are being transposed to the new domain. Deterrence is chief among these but suffers from significant problems, as it has been fundamentally shaped by the nuclear era. The nature of cyberspace as characterised by immateriality and supranationality, with a preponderance of non-state actors, makes the rule sets that defined nuclear deterrence inapplicable. Exacerbating these issues are the real difficulties of achieving credibility and the attribution problem. The cyber deterrence strategies that have hereunto been expounded do not seem to heed these issues, but instead inflame a dangerous rhetoric that fuels a particularly volatile arms race. As an initial step towards ameliorating this situation, this chapter concludes by offering two rudimentary policy suggestions.