Naturalised Modal Epistemology

Abstract

Work on possibility, necessity and possible worlds has flourished since the 1970s, and much of the work on the metaphysics of modality has been pursued in a "metaphysics first" manner-many of those working on the metaphysics of modality have concentrated on first-order questions about modality or possible worlds, and left the epistemologists and methodologists to catch up. This reflects a more general trend in metaphysics of the last few decades: after decades of logical positivists, Wittgensteinians and who-knows-else telling us metaphysics was meaningless or impossible or not respectable, a generation of metaphysicians reacted by setting such sceptical doubts aside and getting on with the job. After all, the theoretical reaches of sciences like physics seem to engage with metaphysical questions, and if an epistemology or philosophy of language tells you that physics is meaningless or unsuccessful, doubt the philosopher rather than give up physics. While I heartily approve of philosophers not waiting for epistemological permission to get on with philosophy, I also think it is welcome that attention is to some extent returning to epistemological questions about modality. These questions are interesting, and hopefully better methods of investigating modality will yield better theories of modality, even if it would be wrong to hold up first-order business until we sort out the epistemology. (If you wait for the question of the method of philosophy to be resolved before you do philosophy, you will be waiting a long time.) There has been some tendency among the metaphysicians who have turned their attention to the epistemology of modality to think that some special method is required for resolving modal questions (and perhaps other metaphysical questions). (See e.g. Bealer